In this paper, a variety of potentially explanatory indicators for child labor and school attendance in Zambia is scrutinized. By analyzing the results from a bivariate probit model, the arising doubt with regard to the income sensitivity of the child labor choice is confirmed. Among other factors, community effects influence the child labor and schooling choice. Based on the results, sensitization, flexible school calendars or narrowly targeted subsidies to at-risk households, provided that children are sent to school, are suggested.
Introduction
Traditionally, income and child labor have almost been viewed as two sides of the same coin (e.g. Bonnet, 1993; Fallon and Tzannatos, 1998; Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995) . However, new doubt has arisen as regards the importance of income and poverty as determinants of child labor. Empirical research has found that the magnitudes of the effect of income and poverty on child labor are moderate (Ray, 2000; Bhatty, 1998; Canagarajah and Nielsen, 2001; Sinha, 1996; Hiraoka, 1997) . This paper adds evidence to confirm this doubt, since the relationship between poverty and the decisions to attend school and to work is found to be vague and relatively small in magnitude.
The decisions to attend school and to work are analyzed. Because the school and work decisions are closely related, they are treated as simultaneous decisions which can be analyzed in the context of a bivariate probit model. A set of individual, household and community characteristics are allowed to affect the school and work decisions. Furthermore, random community effects are included to capture the effect from unobserved community variables such as social norms, traditions or attitudes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the Zambian data used for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the incidence of child labor and school attendance in terms of cross tabulations. Section 4 consists of the results from estimation of a bivariate probit model, and section 5 contains a discussion of which policy implications can be drawn from the model. Concluding remarks are given in section 6.
Data Issues
For the empirical analysis, Priority Survey II for Zambia is used. The data were collected by the Zambian Central Statistical Office with financial support from the World Bank. It is a household survey carried out in 1993; 10,000 households and approximately 55,000 individuals are included. The data set is augmented with data from the Community Survey 1993 on education and infrastructure in the 631 different communities in which the individuals reside.
When considering child labor, ideally children in the age group 5-14 years should be analyzed. However, some of the information which is needed for the empirical analysis is only available for children in the age group 7-14 years, therefore this age group only is analyzed. The upper age limit is chosen because it defines the age where some individuals finish primary school. Because of a limited number of secondary school places, it might be expected that schooling is less of a choice after the age of 14, when the children may have finished primary school and are ready to enter secondary school.
Individuals with missing values for essential variables are excluded, which leaves us with 12,558 individuals. About one-half of the sample are girls and the other one-half are boys; 4,210 reside in rural areas and 8,348 reside in urban areas.
1 Means and standard deviations of the variables are shown in Table 1 .
The questionnaire asks about the activities of the individuals in the seven days before the survey. 'Only school' is an indicator variable given the value one when the child has not been working, and has attended school, fulltime or part-time. 'Only work' is equal to one for children who have been involved in labor activities, and who did not attend school. 'Both work and school' is equal to one if the child is involved in both school and work activities. This includes attending school on a part-time or a full-time basis, while working the main part of the last week. The survey does not reveal part-time work which is therefore not defined as child labor.
For the schooling decision the question asked is: 'Are you currently attending school ?'. This defines school attendance in the broadest sense possible. For the work decision, the question is: 'During the last seven days were you 1) working, 2) not working but looking for work, 3) not working and not looking for work but available for work, 4) student, 5) housewife, 6) other'. Thus according to this definition, child workers are children that spent more time working than attending school during the last week before the survey.
In other words, only child labor that actually interfered with schooling is defined as child labor. Numerous children attend school and work part time, but they are not counted in this survey as child workers. The children working only in the harvest seasons have not been caught in the Zambian data set because the survey was collected from January to April 1993, and the harvest is in May. However, if the months January to April are representative of the year as a whole, a good estimate on child labor has been obtained.
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A child who performs housework is defined as working if housework was referred to as the main activity during the last seven days before the survey. If housework was not explicitly stated as the main activity during the last seven days before the survey, the survey gives no information on performed housework. For 0.29% of the children, housework is stated as the main activity during the last seven days before the survey, and these are mainly girls from urban areas. Because the number of Zambian children who are reported to do housework is so small, it does not have a significant impact on this research, and the children doing housework are defined as working.
Clearly the definition chosen has limitations. By defining only the main activity of the child as child labor, a child who is working seasonally may be included, while a child working year-round but part-time is excluded.
In addition to information about the main activity during the last seven days before the survey, the questionnaire also contains a question about the main activity within the last 12 months before the survey. Either of these two questions can be the basis for a definition of child labor. The main reason for using the answer to the former question is that the answer is not much affected by bad memory. Because the survey was completed over several months, the week before the survey is considered to be representative for the entire year. If the definition of child labor is based on the question about the main activity over the last 12 months before the survey, the estimate of the extent of child labor decreases. Where 13% of the children are reported to have worked the last seven days, only 10% of the children are reported to have worked most of the last 12 months. The memory effect may explain a great deal of this difference. Also, child labor is a sensitive subject. Therefore, it is expected that the respondent (which is most often the father or mother of the child) feels bad about revealing that the child worked most of the last 12 months. It might be less emotionally demanding to say that the child worked during the last seven days. Table 1 shows that 70% of the children only attend school, the number is higher in urban areas than in rural areas, and higher for boys than for girls. In the sample, 8% work only whereas 5% both work and attend school. More children work in rural areas than in urban areas. In the next section a more thorough analysis of these figures is presented.
On average, the children in the sample are 11 years old. Most of the households in which the children reside, own at least one asset. About one-fifth of them have a non-biological relationship to the head of the household. This is because the most common family structure is the extended family, and children are often placed outside the home of their biological parents during their school age.
For the descriptive statistics, the definition of poverty in CSO (1994) is used. It is based on the price of a food basket for an adult male. Two poverty lines are defined on the basis of the imputed household expenditure: 3 an extreme poverty line at K5,910, and a moderate poverty line at K8,480 per adult equivalent (AE). The extreme poverty line is defined as the price of the necessary food basket for an adult male per month, whereas the moderate poverty line is defined as the amount needed if this food basket account for 70% of the monthly budget. About 81% of the children grow up in households falling below the moderate poverty line, and 69% grow up in households falling below the extreme poverty line. These numbers conceal the fact that 91% of the rural children and 'only' 37% of the urban children live in households falling below the extreme poverty line according to this definition. 4 Because the moderate poverty line defines most Zambians as poor, only the extreme poverty line is used. Households below the extreme poverty line are divided in three groups: those with an expenditure per AE below K1,970, those with an expenditure per AE between K1,970 and K3,940, and those with an expenditure per AE in the range K3,940 to K5,910. Among the sampled individuals, 29% belong to households that spend less than one third of the amount which defines poverty.
The fact that public expenditure on primary education fell from US$11 per capita in 1975 to US$2 in 1990 5 , and the fact that salaries were seen as unavoidable expenditures, means that the economic burden of the parents and the local communities increased. Hence, teaching materials, equipment, repair, maintenance, improvement, and construction of additional facilities have become more and more the responsibility of the parents and the local communities. 6 This might have affected the costs and the quality of schooling.
To account for the effect of the quality of schooling, a quality index is created. Several quality indicators that are based on questions asked to the community leader are available, and including all of them gives extremely vague conclusions due to multicollinearity. In accordance with a priori expectations, preliminary analysis shows that the most important quality variable is the condition of the school roofing, and next in importance comes the condition of the school furniture. After that comes the condition of the buildings, maintenance, availability of books in the local market and the number of shifts per day. Thus, an index is created and the quality variables are given weights according to the mentioned order. The index ranges from -4 to 1, and the higher the index the higher the quality. Table 1 shows that the mean of the index is about -1, and the quality is somewhat higher in urban areas compared to rural areas.
Turning to the costs of schooling, fees are K100 per term (US$0.24) 7 on average including payments to the Parents and Teachers' Association. 8 It is difficult to imagine that fees on their own affect school enrollment. Therefore, also the community average of household education expenses per student is applied to measure the cost of education. Averaging over communities reduces the selectivity bias associated with household level expenditure. On the top of fees, this measure includes uniforms, books, and possibly private tuition, and the average is K3,000 (US$7) per student per term in 1993. Even if uniforms may last long and can be handed down to younger siblings, they account for a substantial amount of the household expenses related to education. One uniform for primary school easily costs about US$30. However, in rural and in poor urban areas, the requirement to wear a uniform is not enforced. More substantial school expenses, which are not directly observable, are transportation costs and foregone earnings. When taken together, it is understandable if some parents find that schooling is out of the question because of the high costs. In the light of the poverty discussion above, this is actually a substantial amount.
The average distance to primary and secondary schools is 1 km and 23 km, respectively, and somewhat higher in rural areas. On average, the walking distance is just above half an hour for children from rural areas and a quarter of an hour for children from urban areas.
Incidence of Child Labor: Some Tabulations
In this section the incidence of child labor is described. First, how the frequency of child labor differs across age, provinces and household expenditure is investigated. Focus is then moved to the occupation of the working children. Finally, a back of the envelope calculation of lost GDP due to child labor is presented.
Distribution of child labor across age
A general characteristic of children's activities in Zambia is that school participation is high compared to other African countries, e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, and Cote d'Ivoire (see Canagarajah and Nielsen, 1999) . The activity distribution by age for Zambian children is shown in Table 2 .
One characteristic is that with rising age, the activity tends to shift from neither attending school nor working to doing either or both of the two. Another characteristic is that school participation increases to peak at age 11 due to late enrollment and high repetition rates. After that age, school dropouts cause a steady decline, and child labor increases correspondingly. This picture prevails for both girls and boys, although the decline in school attendance from age 11 to 14 is much stronger for girls than for boys (11 versus 3 percentage points). This gender difference in the decline is due to the fact that girls often marry early or become pregnant. 9 In 7 An exchange rate of K420=US$1 is used throughout the paper. 8 However, for more than 30% of the children, the information on the school fees are missing. The mean for the non-missing observations is K110/(1-0.32)=K147 (US$0.35). Because the number of missing observations is so large, this information is included in the analysis instead of making an ad hoc estimate on the fees in those cases.
9 Jensen and Nielsen (1997) show that 6% of the 7-18 year old school leavers left school because they married or became pregnant.
Further investigation of Priority Survey II for Zambia shows that more girls than boys marry early.
addition, it is possible that parents sacrifice the girls' education rather than that of boys if they are stressed economically, and thus discriminating in favor of boys. Table 2 emphasizes the point made in the previous section that school attendance is much lower and child labor much higher in rural areas than in urban areas. The difference peaks at age 7, where school attendance is 39% in rural areas and 67% in urban areas. However, the rural children catch up, and from age 11 onwards the difference is stable at 12-14 percentage points. Regarding child labor the difference is also large: in rural areas child labor increases from 16% to 27% from age 7 to 14, whereas in urban areas it increases from 1% to 3%. 
Geographical distribution of child labor
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in the incidence of child labor across Zambia. Much of the difference across provinces, is explained by the varying degree of urbanization that correlate negatively with child labor as mentioned in the previous sections. The provinces of Lusaka and the Copperbelt are strongly urbanized, and hence the use of child labor is very rare. On the contrary, the Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern provinces are dominated by rural areas, and here the use of child labor is widespread. The North Western province, however, appears to be an exception: It is mainly rural but child labor seems rare. The North Western province is almost covered by jungle, and therefore, cattle care, which is a common occupation for children, is not very common, and child labor may not be needed as much as in other provinces. In addition, the North Western province has its borders to Angola and Congo, which have been war zones and this may have affected the province. Table 3 which also gives a detailed activity distribution for each province. In addition to the information in Figure 1 , the table reveals that the Copperbelt registers the highest with regard to school attendance (87%), whereas the Eastern province registers the lowest (58%). The other provinces with much child labor have higher school attendance rates mainly because many children are registered as both attending school and working.
The province of Lusaka has a relatively high proportion of children registered as neither attending school nor working. This is because the Lusaka province contains the capital, Lusaka, where most of the poor compounds and slum districts are found, in which inactive children are more common than in other places. The largest number of child workers are found in the Northern province. However, also the Western, Eastern and Southern provinces account for a great deal of the total amount of child labor. Together, the four provinces count 80% of all child laborers. 
Poverty and child labor
In Table 4 poverty indicators are cross tabulated with activity variables. From the table it can be seen that in the poorest households, few children only attend school, and more children work or do neither. In section 4, in which the choice of school attendance versus child labor is modelled, it can be seen that this result does not hold as strongly when other characteristics are controlled for. Table 5 illustrates the occupations of the working children. In Table 5 it is seen that child workers are more often found in rural areas as 197,074 of 208,516 child workers come from rural areas. It also shows that the largest part of the working children were in subsistence farming. Among urban child workers, more than onethird are doing housework, and 11% were in elementary occupations (e.g. street vendors). More girls than boys are occupied in housework, and more boys than girls are occupied in elementary occupations. The table illustrates that older child workers are, to a higher extent, employed outside of subsistence farming, whereas younger child workers are almost exclusively employed in subsistence farming. 
Occupation and incomes of working children

What are the economic gains and losses of child labor? A Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Gains and losses from child labor are analyzed in the context of a cost-benefit analysis of primary education.
Each household decides whether a child should work and earn money now, or attend school and thereby increase potential future earnings. Poor households with high discount rates would tend to choose child labor, and rich households with lower discount rates would choose education. If education pays off or if education is cheap, households would tend to choose education. Table 6 illustrates the central points: a. x is the income from child labor, y is the income of an unskilled adult, and r is the annual return to education. b. Ministry of Education (1996b).
The gains from child labor are difficult to asses because the main part consists of income from child labor. Here two different valuations of child labor are used, one is based on the estimate from a human capital model 10 , the other measure assumes that children earn 30% of the average income of an unskilled adult which is K17,350. Another potential gain from child labor is saved costs of education. Both the saved private costs and the saved public costs are substantial.
The most important loss from using child labor is the lost future income gain because of foregone investment in human capital. A standard human capital model with correction for selection bias due to the participation decision would show a private return of about 7% per year of primary education.
11 For y the mean income for adults without education (K17,350 per month) is used. The cost-benefit analysis is performed under the assumption of a discount rate of both 5% and 20%. The former is relevant for the government or the aid organizations, whereas the latter would be relevant for the private Zambians. Table 7 presents the present values of relevant income streams. Clearly, if the return to primary education was zero, the net private benefit of child labor would be positive. Although the public costs are substantial, the net public benefit could be positive or negative, depending on the social gain from being an educated society. When the return to primary education is not equal to zero, the conclusion is less clear cut. If the discount rate is 5%, child labor would never be an optimal choice, neither for the household nor for society. However, if the discount rate is 20%, child labor might represent an optimal choice. Under the assumption of the largest income from child labor (column two), and a 20% discount rate (the upper part of the table), the private benefit from child labor is positive. Under the assumption of an income from child labor of K1,330 per month, the private loss from using child labor would be K52,316 (US$125) per child.
If the externalities of being an educated society are disregarded (e.g. reduction in fertility, increased complexity of production), a conservative estimate on the social loss from child labor can be made. The social loss should be calculated from the lower part of Table 7 , because the society has a lower discount rate than the households. Under the assumption of the largest income from child labor, the social loss would be K816,412 (US$1,943) per child. If they earn only K1,330 per month it would be K1,085,479 (US$2,584). The number of working children is 208,516 of which two thirds are not enrolled in school. If all the children who are both working and attending school accumulate human capital and finish primary school, the loss would be about US$300 mill. If, on the other hand, all the children who are working forego investment in education because they are not able to do both efficiently, the loss would amount to about US$400 mill.-US$500 mill. This is the present value of the loss from the 7 cohorts of children who attended primary school at the time of the survey. Since the GDP in 1993 was US$3,564 mill, the annual GDP loss would, in the best case, be about 1% and, in the worst case, 2%.
In a country where the per capita growth rate is often negative, these numbers are huge. And because most child workers are found in rural areas, one would expect that residents in rural areas suffer the most from the loss in GDP. This back of the envelope cost benefit analysis serves as a motivation to find out what determines whether children work or attend school. This is the issue of the next section.
Econometric Analysis
This section first presents the econometric technique which is a bivariate probit model with random effects and correction for endogeneity of an explanatory variable. After that, the model estimation results are presented.
Methodology
The dependent variables are two indicator variables: The first indicator variable indicates whether or not an individual worked during the last seven days before the survey, and the second indicates whether or not the individual attended school on a part time or full-time basis at the time of the survey. In the empirical analysis, the simultaneous choices of letting children work, attend school, or both are analyzed.
A bivariate probit model is estimated. The likelihood function for the bivariate probit looks as follows: where x 1i , x 2i are the explanatory variables explaining the probability of working and the probability of attending school, respectively. The coefficients to be estimated are called β 1 and β 2 , and the correlation coefficient is ρ. Investigation of the raw data in Table 2 indicates that the correlation coefficient declines with age. 13 Hence the following relationship is assumed:
where tanh ensures that the correlation coefficient stays within the range [-1,1].
Among the explanatory variables is household expenditure per adult equivalent. This variable might be endogenous. Rivers and Vuong (1988) suggest a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood procedure to estimate a probit model with endogenous regressors, and test for exogeneity of the presumed endogenous 13 For instance for 7-year-olds from rural areas it is seen that .48 neither attend school or work. Under independence, (.48+.36)*(.48+.13)=.51 would be predicted to do neither. For 14-year-olds, the difference is larger, since .10 actually do neither, whereas (.10+.19)*(.10+.63)=.21 would be predicted to do neither under independence.
regressors. The first step implies an OLS estimation of each of the endogenous regressors on a set of instrumental variables. The second step consists of a probit analysis with the endogenous regressor and the least squares residuals from step one among the explanatory variables. A test of whether the coefficient to the least squares residual equals zero is a test of exogeneity. A rejection of exogeneity implies that standard errors should be corrected as a result of using instrumental variables.
To correct for unobserved characteristics that are constant across communities, a community effect is included. 14 A fixed effect approach is not feasible because the high number of communities (631) rule out the possibility of estimating the effects, and the probit model plus the high number of observations per community rule out using a conditional approach. Instead the effects are assumed to be normally distributed random effects. A one-factor loading approach is used, implying that the effect of the random community effect on the two dependent variables is allowed to differ. This is equivalent to including two random effects that are restricted to be perfectly correlated. To correct for the possible bias due to correlation between the explanatory variables and the random effects, intra-community means of the explanatory variables are included. Although this method implies restrictive assumptions it is much better than no correction at all. 
Results
In Table 8 and 9 below, results from the estimation of bivariate probit models are presented. The first part of the tables gives the estimates of the parameters that affect the work decision, whereas the last part of the tables gives the estimates of the parameters that affect the schooling decision. Table 8 presents results from the estimation of simple bivariate probit models, whereas Table 9 contains results from the estimation of bivariate probit models with random community effects. Including random effects entails a risk of inconsistency due to correlation between the explanatory variables and the random effect. Therefore, Table 9 also contains the results after correcting for this inconsistency.
Different likelihood ratio (LR) tests are performed, and they are presented at the bottom of the tables. A LR test clearly suggests that the sample should be split by area of residence, hence this is done before random community effects are included. Furthermore, a LR test for exogeneity of expenditure per AE rejects exogeneity. In addition to the included variables, the instrumental variables are age of the household head squared and indicator variables for the occupation and industry of the household head. R 2 is about 0.50 in all regressions of household expenditure per AE on the instrumental variables.
Increasing expenditure per AE decreases the probability of working in the rural sample, whereas it increases the probability of school attendance in all estimations.
16 A higher level of education of the household head decreases the probability of working in all but the urban sample, whereas it increases school attendance in all samples. Table 8 shows that the probability of working increases with increasing age.
17 This could be interpreted as an indication of the fact that the accumulated human capital increases potential wages and therefore the probability of working. Correspondingly, after age 11, these increased opportunity costs stemming from increasing age decrease school attendance.
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Two variables related to the age of a child are included in the analysis: age and age rank. The age variable catches the effect of the absolute value of the labor of a child of a given age, whereas the age rank variable catches the effect of the relative value of the labor of a family of brothers and sisters. The age rank of a child is high for the young children with many older siblings. The higher the age rank, the lower the probability of working and the higher the probability of attending school, meaning that children who have older siblings are less likely to work and more likely to attend school than those without. The effect of the age rank probably reflects the fact that the older children are worth more in the labor market than their younger siblings. Had a quantity-quality trade-off been relevant, the opposite signs on this coefficient would have been expected.
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Having a non-biological relationship to the head of the household decreases the probability of attending school for all but children in rural areas. This could indicate that rural and urban children live in other households for different reasons.
As in the findings by Lavy (1996) , school fees and quality of schooling have relatively weak effects on the probability of school attendance while the transportation costs are more important. Actually, fees were insignificant and therefore excluded from the equation, whereas the community average of education expenses per student was significant. The index for school quality clearly increases the probability of school attendance in rural areas, and in Table 8 , it also decreases the probability of working. In urban areas the effect is either reverse or insignificant. In most estimations, the walking distance to the nearest primary school, the presence of schools in the community and/or the distance to the nearest primary school in kilometers if it is situated outside the community, affect the probability of working and the probability of attending school. Furthermore, availability of passable roads and availability of public transport decreases the probability of working and increases the probability of school attendance. The effects of transportation costs are much stronger in rural than in urban areas as would be expected. Lavy's hypothesis, that supply constraints on secondary schooling affect the demand for primary schooling because primary school may be a ticket to secondary school, finds some support. School attendance decreases with an increase in the distance to the nearest secondary school, although the effect is not always well-determined. In some estimations, the presence of a secondary school in the community decreases the probability of working, or the distance to the nearest secondary school increases the probability of working.
The correlation coefficient is negative in all the estimations and it decreases with age. This means that with increasing age, children are more likely either to attend school or work and they are less likely to do both or neither compared to the case of independence. For instance for rural areas, it can be computed that the correlation coefficient is -0.38 for a 7-year-old and -0.81 for a 14-year-old. Hence, children tend to specialize in one of the activities when they grow older, presumably to exhaust their comparative advantages. Specialization may be caused by increasing returns to scale of time spent in each of the two activities at higher ages.
As seen in Table 9 , the inclusion of random community effects increases the likelihood values, and more so in rural areas. This means that unobserved community factors are important determinants of the probability of working and attending school. This is consistent with Katav-Herz (2001), who suggests social norms and conformity as a main explanation for the existence of child labor. Hence, communities might be trapped in 'bad' equilibria with child labor because every household does as the other households do. However, Unobserved community factors include omitted community variables and measurement errors in included community variables. The coefficients to the random effect are clearly significant with different signs, meaning that the effect of the random effect on the probability of working and attending school is perfectly, negatively correlated.
A general drawback of random effects models is that the random effects might be correlated with included explanatory variables resulting in inconsistent parameter estimates. To correct for this inconsistency, the Mundlak approach is used. It implies that means of explanatory variables that vary across communities should be included as explanatory variables. The means are included, the model is reduced, and the result is seen in Table 9 .
The intra-community means may also be interpreted. Regarding the education of the household head, Table 9 shows that the higher the education of the household head, the higher the probability of school attendance. This effect is enforced if the household resides in a community with a high average education of the household heads. For rural areas, the probability of attending school decreases if the household owns land. This supports the 'land-needs-labor' explanation rather than the 'asset' explanation. However, the probability of school attendance is increased if the child lives in a community where many households own land. This may reflect that the child lives in a relatively rich community. For urban areas, the estimation without intra-community means showed that a household head working in the formal sector exerted a positive effect on school attendance. When intra-community means are included this turns out to be a community effect: living in a community where it is common that the household heads work in the formal sector, increases school attendance. 
Policy Recommendations
In the previous subsection the results from estimating bivariate probit models were presented. These results allow something to be said about the direction of the effects, but not much about their size. For policy purposes something must be known about the magnitude of the effect of changing a policy variable on the probability of attending school and working. Therefore, the inference of this section is based on the marginal effects of changes in the explanatory variables for a number of standard persons.
Because, in most cases, the gender of the child has a negligible effect on the probability of working and attending school, all the standard persons are girls. They vary with respect to age (8 and 13 years) and area of residence (rural or urban). The rest of the characteristics are those of the average girl from that respective area of residence.
Unobserved community effects
From Table 8 and 9 it was seen that including an unobserved community effect improves the likelihood significantly, especially in rural areas. Table 10 shows the probability of working and the probability of school attendance for standard persons from communities with three different sets of unobserved characteristics: a mean community, a 'good community', (one standard deviation above the mean), and a 'bad community' (one standard deviation below the mean).
20 Table 10 shows that the probability of working for an 8-year-old girl from a rural area is 28 percentage points higher if she comes from a bad community than if she comes from an average community. The similar number for a 13-year-old is 38 percentage points. For urban areas the numbers are smaller in magnitude. The probability of school attendance is less affected by unobserved community characteristics; for 8-year-olds from urban areas where the effect is largest, the probability of school attendance declines by 7 percentage points if the individual comes from a bad community. 20 It might seem strange that the probability of working and the probability of school attendance do not correspond directly to the probabilities presented in Table 2 . However, this is because the model is non-linear, which means that the probabilities for the mean person are not equal to the mean probability in the sample. This is why coming from a bad community affects the probabilities more (measured in percentage points) than coming from a good community does.
In urban areas, the probability of working is zero unless the individual comes from a community with bad unobserved characteristics. Nothing else matters. In rural areas the unobserved community characteristics are important, but also other variables have an effect.
Income effect
Tables 11 and 12 present selected marginal effects for standard persons from rural and urban areas, respectively. The first thing to notice is that the marginal effect of an income change is surprisingly small, even though the effect has increased after correction for endogeneity of income. Therefore, a striking conclusion from the analysis is that poverty and low income are not the main explanations for child labor in Zambia. Though poverty is mentioned in the theoretical literature as a main hypothesis in explaining child labor (e.g. Bonnet, 1993; Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995; Fallon and Tzannatos, 1998) , that result is usually not confirmed in empirical literature. For a whole range of different countries empirical studies find that income and poverty are not the main explanatory factors, see Ray (2000) , Bhatty (1998) , Hiraoka (1997) , Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) . Field studies in India show the same result, see Sinha (1996) and M.V. Foundation (1996) . The latter states that " … the Foundation has realized that poverty as a factor behind non-enrollment and child labor comes third in importance. The tradition of the family and access to school are the first and second most important factors, respectively." The first most important factor is closely related to the finding by Katav-Herz (2001) that norms and conformity are important.
A second finding from this analysis is that the marginal effects of income changes differ with age, and they are larger for children from communities with unfavorable unobserved characteristics than for their peers from communities with more favorable unobserved characteristics. A third finding is that the income effects are higher in rural than in urban areas.
For rural children the income elasticity of child labor is below one. Rural children work more frequently than urban children as they account for 197,074 out of 208,516 working children (see Table 5 ). Of the working children, 80% come from the four provinces (Western, Northern, Southern, Eastern) with the highest incidence of child labor (see Table 3 ). Most child laborers are in the upper end of the analyzed age-interval (see Table  2 ). Furthermore, Table 10 shows that the probability of working increases by 38 percentage points if the child comes from a community with bad unobserved characteristics, and hence it is expected that most child workers come from this type of community. Therefore, the income effect which is calculated for a 13-year-old girl from a 'bad' community in the rural part of the Eastern province is probably close to being representative for the household of a potential child worker. This marginal effect of a rise in income of K1,000, i.e. a 34% increase, is -9.53 percentage points, see Table 11 . 21 Therefore, even for this group of children who are most exposed to the risk of working, the probability of working is rather insensitive towards changes in household expenditure per capita. Roughly, a countrywide real growth of 2% through 15 years or 1% through 30 years would decrease child labor by one fifth. The indicator variable for whether or not the household owns an asset and whether or not they have access to credit also to some extent reflects poverty. Owning an asset increases the probability of attending school by 4-5 percentage points. Similarly, availability of credit from a bank decreases the probability of working by 4-6 percentage points. If a household is not allowed to borrow on the financial capital market, and if they own no assets, their only possibility of covering a sudden drop in income is to borrow on the human capital market, i.e. let the children work instead of attending school.
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The education of the household head is often suggested as an indicator that can be used to identify vulnerable households. It is found that one extra year of education of the child's own household head would decrease child labor in the 'bad' communities by about one percentage point and increase the probability of school attendance by about two percentage points in rural areas. An increase in the average education of household heads in the community has an effect of similar magnitude. In urban areas, the effect of the education of the child's own household head is a bit smaller, although the effect of living in a well-educated community is of similar size.
Cost effects
The effect of reducing the education expenses by K1,000 would be an increase in school attendance by about 4-5 percentage points in rural areas and one percentage point in urban areas. 23 Hence, reducing school costs is also a relatively inefficient way of reducing child labor and increasing school attendance.
In rural areas, reducing the transportation costs might be a successful way of reducing child labor and increasing school attendance. Having an all year passable road in the community reduces child labor in the 'bad' communities by more than 10 percentage points, whereas it increases school attendance by 6-8 percentage points. Similarly, the presence of a primary school in the community increases school attendance by 7-9 percentage points, and reducing the walking distance by one hour increases school attendance by 2-3 percentage points. 
Subsidy
The design of a subsidy to reduce child labor is important. As the analysis has shown, some groups are more frequently using child labor than others, and also the school attendance of some groups of children is more sensitive to changes in costs than that of others. The effectiveness of a subsidy would obviously improve if the subsidy is targeted to the groups that use child labor the most, and those who are most sensitive to changes in income and costs. In practice, one way to target a subsidy is to give subsidies to households in the geographical areas where the mentioned characteristics of high child labor and low school attendance are common.
Subsidies should be targeted to areas where school attendance is low and child labor prevalent. Furthermore, the subsidy should not be paid to children who fail to attend school, which could be avoided if the subsidy was paid on a daily or a weekly basis. Another possibility is subsidies like the food-for-school programs, where the children get food at school if they are present. It is often seen that mothers care more about the welfare of the children than fathers, and therefore, one could argue that the money should be paid to the mothers and not the fathers.
The results presented in Tables 8 and 9 , give an indication of who should be the target of the subsidy. It was found that including random community effects improved the model immensely. Coming from a community with unobserved characteristics which are worse than the mean minus one standard deviation increases the probability of working by more than 30 percentage points in some cases. Furthermore, child labor, in particular, but also the school attendance of these children are generally more sensitive to changes in income than that of others. Therefore, identifying the above-mentioned communities, would be a good investment.
A subsidy could be given either in the form of an educational subsidy or an income subsidy. As the fees in Zambia are negligible, the costs of an educational subsidy, which refunds the fees for the working children would be small in comparison to the cost of other policies. However, the previous section showed that fees have no impact on whether or not a child attends school. Therefore, it is plausible that this subsidy would not be successful in reducing child labor and increasing school attendance. In addition to payment of fees comes textbooks, notebooks, and the expensive uniform, which makes about K3,000 per term (see Table 1 ). On top of that comes direct costs in terms of transportation costs, and indirect costs in terms of foregone earnings. It is likely that the parents would need compensation for all the costs of schooling before they would decide to send the children to school, and that would increase the cost of the subsidy substantially. The previous sub-section showed a significant, though small, impact of decreasing the total education expenses and a larger effect of decreasing transportation costs on school attendance.
An income subsidy could be targeted to the poor, to rural areas, or especially to the Western, Northern, Southern, and Eastern provinces. In rural areas, there are almost one million children of primary school age, and most of these live in households below the extreme poverty line. Any significant income subsidy to such a large group would cost a fortune. In the Western province, in which the incidence of child labor is the largest, there is 144,214 children of primary school age, one-third of which are working. In the four mentioned provinces, there are 723,449 children of which 23% works. An income subsidy to this group, or more realistically to the poor, or to residents in rural areas of these provinces would be slightly more viable and more effective.
It would be even more effective to identify communities with characteristics that induce child labor or reduce school attendance. The analysis identifies some 'fixed community effects' that indicate who should be the recipients of such a subsidy. School attendance is low for children residing in communities where the household heads have a low level of education. In addition, in rural areas, school attendance is low for children who live in communities where it is unusual to own land or unusual to have children who are not closely biologically related to the head of the household.
In order to reduce child labor it would be more effective if the communities with 'bad' unobserved characteristics could be identified. According to the analysis above, targeting those communities would increase the efficiency of subsidization.
The incidence of child labor is not very sensitive to income. In the Eastern province, where the sensitivity is relatively large, the effect of an increase in expenditure per AE of K1,000 would be a reduction of the probability of child labor by about three to five percentage points, and about nine percentage points if the community have 'bad' unobserved characteristics. In urban areas and in the North-Western and the Copperbelt provinces, the effect would be smaller.
If it was possible to give the income subsidy under the condition that the child stops working and attends school, the subsidy would work as a compensation for lost labor income, and the effect might be larger.
What is likely to be the most successful policy in Zambia ?
If the reason for child labor is economic externalities such as failure of the market for education, or a too low weight of child welfare in the household welfare function, the optimal policy would be to internalize the externalities, and not to ban child labor. In either of the two cases, the problem is that the private benefits fall below the private costs of education, whereas the social gains exceed the social costs, and thus the household would make an inoptimal choice from society's point of view. In these two cases, child labor represents economic rationality, and it would be inoptimal to ban it, a better policy would be to change parameters that would change incentives.
However, an enforced ban of child labor might be a viable policy if the reasons for child labor are traditions or attitudes. It might be that tribal traditions and attitudes towards education play a role as to the extent of child labor in some areas of Zambia. Actually, that could be the explanation why the unobserved community effects are important. A less excessive policy would be sensitization, which might change traditions and attitudes. However, if the economy or community is trapped in a 'bad' equilibrium due to social conformity (KatavHerz, 2001 ), low parental human capital (Dessy, 2000) or a low adult/child wage ratio (Basu and Van, 1998) , a policy with an initial 'jump' is needed to reduce child labor. A ban or another compulsive measure might constitute such a policy.
In the long run, the annual GDP loss caused by child labor may be substantial. Especially, the rural areas would suffer because child workers mainly come from rural areas. An educational subsidy in terms of a reduction of school fees or payments to PTAs would be relatively cheap, but it would not reduce child labor significantly.
Introducing an income subsidy, on the other hand, would be expensive even if it has a narrow target. However, if it is possible to condition the subsidy on no work and school attendance, the effect of a moderate subsidy would be significant for some groups of children, since the subsidy would play the role of reducing the potential labor income or the general education expenses. In practice this could be implemented by 'food-for-schoolprograms' or bonuses after completing a grade.
The analysis shows that children from households that own land are much more likely to work, and much less likely to attend school than others. This result might support an introduction of flexible school calendars, such that school does not interfere with work on the farm.
Reducing transportation cost in rural areas would have a significant impact. Availability of public transport and/or a passable road in the community decreases child labor and increases school attendance. Similarly, the presence of a primary school and the walking distance measured in hours is important.
Some effect of changing school quality was found in rural areas. Changing the quality index by one unit increases school attendance by 1-2 percentage points. Improving the condition of the school roofing represents an increase in the index of two units, whereas improving on the condition of the furniture represents an increase of one unit. Quality variables cover a whole community, and they express the opinion about quality from the community leader only, therefore, there might be omitted variables or measurement error.
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In the case of Zambia, it is found that the poor, children from rural areas, and from the Western, Northern, Southern, and Eastern provinces, are more likely to work than others. Therefore, targeted income subsidies, and an effort to reduce transportation costs or enhance quality are expected to be more effective for these groups than for others.
Conclusion
A cost-benefit analysis predicts a total GDP loss of 1-2% of GDP annually from using child labor instead of sending the children to school. This is rather substantial in a country where the annual growth is occasionally negative. The most worrisome fact about this GDP loss is that it takes place in rural areas where most of the poor live. This observation is a good motivation for scrutinizing the reasons for child labor and lack of school attendance.
In this paper, the characteristics of child workers and the determinants of the incidence of child labor in Zambia have been analyzed. As expected, more child workers were found among the poor than among the better off, and more child workers among the older children than among the young children. Furthermore, more child labor was found in rural areas than in urban areas, which is a general characteristic of child labor in Africa. In Zambia, child workers are concentrated in the Western, Northern, Eastern, and Southern provinces, and the incidence of child labor is the highest in the Western province.
In accordance with the tendency in the recent child labor literature, this empirical analysis for the case of Zambia shows that child labor is not particularly responsive to changes in income. The effect of an income increase is significantly negative for most groups of children, and it is somewhat larger for children from communities with 'bad' unobserved characteristics than it is for others. Surprisingly, child labor and schooling are only moderately sensitive to changes in education expenses and quality of schooling, if the constructed quality index can be taken as a valid indicator of that.
The analysis suggests certain policy recommendations. An income subsidy is a useful device to reduce the incidence of child labor. However, even in the case of narrow targeting, an income subsidy is rather expensive, and it should be substantial to have any effect at all. A viable alternative is to target the subsidy to the rural parts of the four mentioned provinces, and insert a condition that the children in the households receiving the subsidy must attend school and are not allowed to work at all.
Changing economic incentives through poverty reduction, introduction of income subsidies or enhancing school quality might have an effect, but based on the present analysis, other policies are expected to be more effective. An operational approach would be to identify and visit the communities where child labor is common, and investigate what community characteristics affect their behavior. This field work would uncover the unobserved community factors that the analysis finds so important for the use of child labor. It would reveal whether sensitization is needed to change traditions or attitudes, or whether school quality, credit availability or infrastructure should be improved upon; a question which is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
